Four ways of triadic ‘sign-ness’ on two semiotic squares

Herman Tamminen

Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu
Jakobi St 2, Tartu 51014, Estonia
e-mail: tamminen@ut.ee

Abstract. The article deals with semiosis and its dimensions as a theoretical construct to show some elementary differences between spheres of semiotic activity. In essence, one sign will be dissected into four categories of existence to show it may have different relations depending on the dimension it happens to be in. The general framework is that of human consciousness and its two distinct states: awake cognition and asleep dreaming with emphasis on the latter. From our point of view, the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ have two layers: the manifest form and the latent function, the seen and the unseen. These are used as parallels to support the central thesis of this article that human cognition has dreaming as its counterpart.

The main theoretical frame is drawn from the work of Greimas and Courtés with emphasis on the semiotic square. The concept of the sign is taken from Peirce, whereas ‘sign-ness’ is adopted from Pyatigorskij. By projecting the triadic sign onto the semiotic square and excluding the concept ‘sign system’ along with the syntactic aspect, the basic fourfold dimension of the sign as such will be brought to view based on the distinct sign-relations in each given dimension. In order to double the square, semiosis will be endowed with features of ‘being-able’, thus affording the initial expression of dominant modalities serving as basis for the structure(s) of the elementary function and mechanism in each of the four dimensions. This will also enable bringing into view some elementary restrictions on semiosis in each dimension. Lastly, some new terms are suggested in accordance with what has been presented.

Keywords: semiosis; consciousness; dream; semiotic square; ‘sign-ness’; Peirce

https://doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2017.45.1-2.11
Introduction

“Semiosis is that operation which, by setting up a relationship of reciprocal presupposition between the expression form and the content form – or the signifier and signified – produces signs. [...] By semiosis can also be meant the semic category of which two constituent terms are the expression form and the content form (or, signifier and signified).” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285)

Semiosis produces signs, enabling the generation of meaning. This says very little, and often enough semiosis is treated either as a (thought) process or as a function in nature and/or culture; the inevitable outcomes of which – meanings – are the sole part known to the interpretant in an infinite series of interpretata1. This is the case in the sphere of consciousness in a state facilitating a suitable structure for cognitive mentation to “take place”, and therefore I will not touch the subject of semiosis from any other viewpoint. Also, sign-function is excluded from the first half of this paper in order to delve into the four most elementary spaces known to us for potential semioses. In order to taper towards a single semiostasis, its different dimensions, and to exclude the systematicity or infinite continuance of semiosis, I adopt Pyatigorskiij's view in that semiotics, instead of emphasizing the ‘sign-system’ or the ‘sign,’ should rather concentrate on ‘sign-ness’ as its central concept:

But sign-ness is not the PRIMARY (or ELEMENTARY) concept of semiotics since it is the abstraction of a particular QUALITY, namely, to formulate it in the most general terms, the abstraction of THE QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN, or, in a more expanded formulation, of SOMETHING'S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE. The semantic aspect of the problem is expressed in the words 'to be a sign of something', the pragmatic by 'to be a sign for someone', the communicative by 'to be a sign somewhere'. (The syntactic aspect is not expressed here, since the concept 'sign system' is not being considered.) (Piatigorsky 1974: 185 [emphasis original])

The hypothesis of this paper depends on the well-recognized fact that intra- and interspecific boundaries as well as the boundaries of more abstract and/or concrete semiotic spaces can never be experientially transgressed, penetrated into and comprehended in their totality. Depending on the semiotic subject's modalities and competence with regard to the meaning(s) of a given sign, “the relations [...] are of a radically different eidetic type in the logical and the semiotic universes” (Petitot 2004: 210). That is, ‘sign-ness’ in human umwelten is not necessarily ‘sign-ness’ in nature

1 “They are called “interpretata” since they are dealt with in the process of interpretation, and it is to them that the semiosis ultimately relates, although they are often “absent” or inaccessible to direct perception. However, interpretata can also be imagined objects, such as “unicorns”, which are only remotely connected to objects existing outside the organism” (Krampen 1997: 250).
or other semiotic spaces and vice versa. Hence, for one sign there must be different dimensions of semiosis. Disregarding the syntactic aspect, i.e. sign function and theorizing about a single sign by dissecting it onto four categories of existence, each will be shown to have its own peculiar semiotic modes or conditions for ‘sign-ness’. Thus my aim is to make a point why certain boundaries remain unbreachable.

The fourfold dimension of Representamen, (non-)Object and (non-)Interpretant

The semiotic square is suitable for establishing a preliminary typology of relations necessary “to distinguish intrinsic features, those which constitute the category, from those that are foreign to it” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) with regard to major semiotic dimensions. As can be noticed, Pyatigorskij’s definition of ‘sign-ness’ echoes Peirce’s definition of a sign: “[A] sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). In addition to this similarity, the triadic sign at its simplest definition is commonplace in semiotics, and its elements – representamen (R), object (O) and interpretant (I) – are used also in this article.

In general, ‘object’ is anything we can think or talk about. It pays to notice that objects do not need to be physical and that the lack of an object would deprive the sign of its being a sign, i.e. representamen, at all: “it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise its interpretant” (CP 1.339).

Signs – according to semiotics – are very real and responsible for reality itself; they make their way so that “the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretation again” (CP 1.339). The infamous infinite series created in this fashion is halted via “ontologization” of the semiotic square thus affording semiosistasis and hence, on the axis of sub-contraries, instead of calling (I) non-interpretant and (O) non-object which would be in accordance with the inner logic and terminology of the semiotic square, we designate (I) to point to the absence of interpretation under will and (O) to the absence of knowledge of objects, though at times the prefix ‘non-’ is used. However unorthodox, the triadic sign is projected onto the semiotic square.

The diagram (Fig. 1) is an adaptation of the semiotic square as presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982: 309). In the diagram, representamen (R), or ‘sign-ness’ is placed in the middle for the following reasons:

---

2 The semiotic/psychoanalytic tradition of dream analysis and dream interpretation is not discussed here. It is not the aim of this paper to say this or that of the formation or interpreted meaning of dreams but only of the possible forms of sign as such in four dimensions.
(i) we, and according to us all other beings, have no access to anything without it being (an interpretation of) a representation, i.e. a sign, and;
(ii) by extension this argument applies both to nature and culture.

The first point concerns the elementary proposition of (anthropo-)semiotics and the minimal requirement for something to be interpreted or function as a sign. Here, however, there is no function. The representamen and its constituents irrespective of the dimension discussed are treated as static. The second point is that the use of the same mark for representamen (R) and ‘sign-ness’ is applicable in all aspects. The relations, albeit iconically depicted with dissimilar placement of the arrows from those of the original, remain the same as the ones shown on the diagram’s legend. There are, however, some alterations.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{A} \\
\cdots \\
\text{O} \\
\text{I} \\
\text{N} \\
\text{R} \\
\text{I} \\
\text{O} \\
\text{Z} \\
\end{array}
\]

- $\leftrightarrow$: relation of contrariety
- $\uparrow$: relation of complementarity
- $\nwarrow$: relation of contradiction
- $\cdots$: relation of simple presupposition
- $\uparrow\downarrow$: relation of reciprocal presupposition

Figure 1. Relations of (R) representing triadic ‘sign-ness’ in four dimensions as projected onto the semiotic square.
First of all, this is not “the visual representation of the logical articulation of any semantic category” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308) nor exactly does it concern “the elementary structure of signification, when defined [...] as a relation between at least two terms [which] rests only on a distinction of opposition which characterizes the paradigmatic axis of language” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 308). The latter definition is somewhat closer to what is being done here; to distinguish ‘dimensions’ of semiosis as understood by human cognition, i.e. the elementary mechanisms and functional principles of distinct semiotic spaces where we consider signs to be the elements that enable activity.

This adaptation also strives to offer a supplementation for semiosis as an elementary axiological\(^3\) structure by example of the triadic sign in order to prepare ground for possible future elaborations of abstract categories of value. Though excluded at first, it may be noted that as a term semiosis is “synonymous with semiotic function” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 285).

On the axis of contraries, object (O) and interpretant (I) are in opposition – were it possible to distinguish a single semiosis in actuality, then strictly speaking the interpretant could never be the object. However, they are both presupposed and “can be present concomitantly [...] they are said to enter into a relation of reciprocal presupposition or which comes to the same thing, a relation of contrariety” (Greimas, Courtes 1982: 309). In other words, were there no (representations of) objects, the interpretations (of representations) would not exist either, although in cases their categorial positions are interchangeable.

Including from the middle representamen (R) we find the traditional triad ‘R–O–I’ forming a sign, i.e. the utmost minimal requirement for constituting (conscious, cognitive) semiosis in the human mind. In our world of awake, there are at least two categories of objects – the physically real and the imaginary interpretata. That is, as animals we are endowed with senses that enable the perception of physical objects and as thinking beings we may indulge in musing on the imaginary, creating unicorns and like interpretata that are semiotic objects, albeit immaterial in their being. For a person to receive a representation of an object, s/he needs to be awake (A) for interpretation (I). “In order that an interpretant might emerge, it must enter into interaction with some interpreter” (merrell 2013: 28). That is, were I unconscious, I would not know I (can) think. Thus, by incorporating the awake state (A) we end up with the quadruple

\[^3\] “In semiotics, the term axiology designates the paradigmatic mode of existence of values, in contrast to ideology, which assumes the form of their syntagmatic and actantial arrangement. [...] Insofar as we are dealing with general categories – which can be considered, as a working hypothesis, as semantic universals – that can be articulated according to the semiotic square, a distinction can be drawn between elementary axiological structures (of an abstract nature) and figurative axiological structures.” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 21)
‘R–O–I–A’, which may be said to be our basic dimension of acknowledged being, the existential whereabouts and semiotic elements by which I know ‘I’ am when awake.

On the positive deixis, there is in addition to the representamen (R), an object (O) but there is no interpretant (Ī) in the human sense. As one may infer, the semiotic dimension of the positive deixis is that of nature (N). The lack of freedom for abstract endowment of meaning and/or arbitrary interpretation in nature is based on Uexküll’s (1982: 28) claim that “because no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may assert that they never enter into relationships with neutral objects.” This is adopted to apply to all of nature; it is only in the human semiotic that “[Through] every relationship the neutral object is transformed into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of which is imprinted upon it by a subject” (Uexküll 1982: 28). It may be said that in nature, the objects’ relations to subjects are limited by their physical being – there are no immaterial or imaginary objects, no abstract interpretata in nature.

This is not to say that nature (N) would totally lack interpretations, but that it is considerably narrower and more restricted when it comes to creating new information in this way. Or rather, it is slow to happen within aeons unobservable for the human intellect. Allowing this, it may be said that the quadruple ‘R–O–Ī–N’ forms the semiotic dimension of beasts and organic matter, including our bodies. It must be noted, however, that cultured nature, i.e. biotic and organic matter submitted to human will such as fields of genetically enhanced crops, cloned livestock and the like, will not be considered here, no matter whether they belong to nature or not.

On the negative deixis, we find as proper only interpretation (I) of representation (R) but no object (Ō). This is based on the presumption that culture (C) – whether seen as a semiospheric phenomenon of a mnemonic mechanism or as any other terminological construct – cannot with certainty be said to be conscious of its (physical) self through senses in order to receive information via or from objects, but only their representations interpreted: “The history of culture is reflected as an evolution of interpreting culture – on one side by its contemporary auditorium, on the other by next generations, including the scientific tradition of interpretation” (Lotman 1999: 39; my translation, H. T.).

Culture is to itself simultaneously a subject and an object, neither of which overlaps with the other in a single semiosis. For the sake of the argument, physical objects with regard to ‘sign-ness’ in culture are treated as elements that from the point of view of culture “are not bearers of meaning, as it were do not exist. The fact of their actual existence recedes to the background in face of their irrelevance in the given modelling system. Though existing, they as it were cease to exist in the system of culture” (Lotman 1990: 58).

Excluding the overlapping boundaries and the typology of culture for the sake of convenience, culture’s elementary functional mechanism can be said to be interpreting itself through representations (of non-objects) within itself, constituting the semiotic dimension of culture ‘R–Ō–I–C’; a supra-individual monad of its own rank.
On the axis of subcontraries, there is no object (Ō) nor an interpretant (Ī) proper but only a representation (R) in and of a physically unreal dimension – dream (Z). Discussing dreams, Lotman (2009) claims that “the moment a temporary space (the pause) between impulse and reaction appeared represented a turning point in the history of consciousness” and that this new state of being “requires the development and improvement of memory” which, in its turn brought forth “the transformation of the reaction to an immediate action into a sign” thus shifting the orientation to reaction from the basic biological schema ‘stimulus – response’ towards information, creating “an independent structure capable of assimilation into an ever more complex and self-developing mechanism” (Lotman 2009: 142). That is, conscious being and what followed.

In general, dreaming is “an endogenously mediated perceptual experience occurring physiologically during sleep [...] in a format which the dreamer tends to experience as a participant rather than a mere observer” (Blom 2010: 157). In other words, the Traumwelt is a polylingual semiotic space which is immutable by conscious action due to nescience of existence or, as mutable as mundane reality by will of thought. The dream “does not immerse us in visual, verbal, musical and other spaces but rather in the space of their coalescence which is analogous to real space” (Lotman 2009: 145). Then, duly in a dream, even more so than when awake, “the form of meaning articulates a substance which cannot be empirically observed” (Petitot 2004: 191). Regardless, the dream becomes known – for us – in retrospect in the awake dimension where it intrudes as a memory of and in itself.

“We only know dreams from our memory of them after we are awake” (Freud 1965: 76). Through recollection, despite the randomness and different order of things than in the accustomed to awake surroundings, the ‘I’ of Traumwelt is still by force of circumstance exactly the same as the one you think you are best acquainted with daily, only existing in a different reminiscential world than that of awake. “Any act of semiotic recognition must involve the separation of significant elements from insignificant ones in surrounding reality” (Lotman 1990: 58). Analogous to real space and consisting of “signs of who knew what, i.e. signs in their pure form” (Lotman 2009: 143), dream may be said to form for us a second(ary) sphere of semiotic existence ‘R–Ō–Ī–Z’ in which we

4 There are two reasons why the term dream is marked with (Z). Firstly, it is presumed that in a dream everything may represent something else and secondly, it is visually customary to use (Z) to point out that someone is sleeping which is the minimal requirement for dreaming proper.
5 From German Traum [‘dream’] + German Welt [‘world’].
6 Occasions of lucid dreaming – dreams in which one knows one is dreaming and can control one’s behaviour and environment to an extent – are excluded here alongside hypnagogic/hypnopompic hallucinations.
are incapable of action and not aware that ‘I’ exists, or, to say the least, the ‘am’ of ‘I’ is different due to different surroundings in a different setting experientially wholly as real.

Thus, we have at least four separate7 semiosic dimensions for ‘sign-ness’ according to some very general principles and, as was proposed, the ‘something’s quality of being a sign of something for someone in some place’ within each domain is unbreachable as the exact same sign from one dimension to the other due to the specific qualities of the dimensions. The four dimensions are, in essence:

- that of awake (R–O–I–A), in which conscious (anthropo-) semiosis occurs;
- that of nature (R–O–Ī–N), in which organic (bio-) semiosis occurs;
- that of culture (R–Ō–I–C), in which inorganic (cultural) semiosis occurs;
- that of dream (R–Ō–Ī–Z), in which unaware (oneiric) semiosis occurs.

So far it has been presumed that the presence of elements of a given sign oscillates according to ‘sign-ness’ in each of the four dimensions. However, this is not the case in the strict sense – especially as regards the lack of interpretation in nature and lack of object in culture. It would be somewhat absurd to claim that the triadic sign would retain its ‘sign-ness’ or enable semiosis if crippled into a twopartite triadic sign. Indeed, if there were no interpretation in nature nor object in culture, evolution in both would be excluded. Hence for the sake of clarity, the sign so far has been treated as semiosistatic and the proposed lack is not an unconditional one but a purely theoretical one that serves to point to the dominant element of semiosis in each dimension. “The dominant may be defined as the focusing component [...] it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components” (Jakobson 1981: 751). More generally in tetralemmic terms, in nature the object either is or is not (affirmation/negation) for a given subject, whereas in culture the object is and is not (equivalence); in dream the object neither is nor is not (neither) whereas awake the object’s mode of being depends on the contextual situation of a given sign – a discussion which we will not enter here.

Moreover, it may be argued that nature (N) and culture (C) are in a relation of simple presupposition – the relation between the presupposing term and the presupposed term: “By presupposed term is understood that term, the presence of which is the necessary condition for the presence of the presupposing term, while the presence of the presupposing term is not the necessary condition for the presupposed term” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243). Chronologically speaking, culture (C) could not have evolved had there been no nature (N), whereas nature does not require the presence of culture (C) in order to exist.

---

7 Granted, nature and culture are interdependent and all dimensions are interconnected in human existence, but here they are viewed as distinct for the sake of argument.
On the other hand, awake (A) and dream (Z) are in a relation of reciprocal presupposition, both terms (or dimensions) being simultaneously presupposing and presupposed. The relation between them as states of consciousness and semioses therein is predominantly “either that of combination, on the syntagmatic axis, or that of opposition, on the paradigmatic axis” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 243), emphasized according to the potential assortment of facilitatory forms of meaning or structures of consciousness.

In general it may be said that awake semiotic is more syntagmatic, causal and logical; dream semiotic is more paradigmatic, random and alogical. Although occasions of lucid dreaming and the like were excluded above, they may be mentioned here to point to the possibility of functional concomitance between dream (Z) and awake (A), i.e. the possibility of their co-presence in either state as parts manifest or latently lingering in the other after the transformation of one state into the other. That is, to an extent aware cognition may be present in a dream and unaware cognition in reality. Based on the subject’s overall knowledge, an individual’s umwelt and Lebenswelt form a Traumwelt of which we are aware, as well as of the other dimensions, only by default of our own peculiar semiotic mode. It must be noted that in addition to their separate natures, all four dimensions are embodied by the human essence; the body is of nature, mind of awake, the dream an intersection and culture an extension.

It is also worth noting that remembered dreams are sometimes puzzling and may show “an extraordinary persistence in memory” (Freud 1965: 76). Suggestively speaking, a core phylogenetic function of this mnemonic translatory cycle may have been to bridge the gap between ens realis (body) and (pre-)archaic ens rationis (mind), sealing “the structure of the “I” [that] is one of the basic indices of culture” (Lotman 2009: 147).

**Being-able-to semiosis**

From the point of view of conscious experience, semiosis is an unavoidable semiotic mechanism that as a function constitutes sign-action in human cognition and, according to some of them, it is responsible for things happening elsewhere as well. From the framework of a theory of modalities, the concept of “being-able (to do or to be)” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23) is adopted here as an operational term in order to clarify the elementary functional natures of the above semiosic dimensions. This of course requires some clarification and extrapolation of terms.

Modality – in general terms – is that which modifies the predicate of an utterance\(^8\) whereas modalization is “conceived as the production of a so-called modal utterance,\(^8\) \^[..."] we understand utterance to mean any entity endowed with meaning, belonging either to spoken strings or to written texts, prior to any linguistic or logical analysis” (Greimas,
which over-determines a descriptive utterance” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 193). Not delving that much deeper into theory, it may be stated that the most elementary types of modal utterances are utterances of doing\(^9\) or of state\(^{10}\). They pertain to the dichotomy transmogrification/pertuity and “can be found either in the syntactic description of descriptive utterances or in the hypertactic description of modal utterances” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 194).

Producing signs, semiosis is an infinite process of ‘being’ that “serves as copula in utterances of state” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 22). Synonymous with semiotic function, semiosis is a doing between two states. Artificially frozen as an object of knowledge ‘being’, both ‘doing’ and ‘state’ are applicable to semiosis, which as a whole can be treated as being-able. The term “being-able (to do or to be) can be considered as the name of one of the possible predicates of the modal utterance governing a descriptive utterance of doing or of state” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23). As such, both possible predicates are elementary modal utterances definable by their respective transitive aims and by this “two modal structures of being-able are to be considered; the one comprises an utterance of state and is called for convenience’s sake being-able-to-be; the other has for its object an utterance of doing: being-able-to-do” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23). Being-able-to-do can also be projected onto the semiotic square to bring it into accordance with the above dimensions (see Fig. 2).

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{being-able-to-do} \\
\text{(freedom)} \\
\text{being-able-not-to-do} \\
\text{(independence)} \\
\text{not-being-able-not-to-do} \\
\text{(submission)} \\
\text{not-being-able-to-do} \\
\text{(powerlessness)}.
\end{array}\]

\text{Figure 2. Being-able-to-do projected onto the semiotic square (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 23).}

\(^{9}\) “As the predicate-function of such an utterance, doing is to be considered, in an anthropomorphic syntactic language, as the conversion of the transformation relation.” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 93)

\(^{10}\) “The term state can be homologated with that of continuous” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 311). According to Greimas and Courtés, “In semiotics, any entity is considered to be continuous prior to analysis [...] which, alone, permits the construction of discontinuous or discrete units” (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 58).
To complement the elementary functions of semiosis through being-able-to-do, the values of the modal categories as presented above along with the explicated sign-relations in different dimensions will be shown to define the reach of semiosis as sign-function in each. In addition, (A) must at points be extended to the concept of ‘alive’ and ‘light’, whereas (Z) must at points extend to the concept of ‘dead’ and ‘dark’. This should not be a far-fetched metaphor.

In light of the above and general knowledge of semiotics, it may be said that what is received of a sign by a semiotic entity is its representamen (R). Granted, the way the semiotic square has been used so far, it remains a first generation square regardless of the positioning of the dimensions being visually similar to the second generation of terms as in the original. Albeit omnipresent, the dimensions belong to different semantic and overall semiotic categories. Strictly, (A) and (Z) are two main states of consciousness available and comprehensible to all, but, as is obvious, the majority of people are part nature (N) part culture (C) and so, however semiosis occurs in either or both, it is applicable to the human and its intellect in consciousness. Allowing this, I will now offer a terminological supplementation and by way of a 45° tilt, an extended adaptation of the semiotic square as presented in Fig. 3.

Figure 3. Square on square with dimensions (N/A/C/Z), functional principles (N–Z/C–A) and elementary mechanisms (N–A/C–Z) of semiosis along with proposed terminology.
Supplementation and adaptation

The four semiosic dimensions abstracted from the semiotic square require in part to be re-attached to fit the tilted square of being-able-to-do. For clarity’s sake, this will be done by introducing new terminology with regard to dimensions, their elementary mechanisms and functional principles. Unfortunately, only two basic functions will be provided: that of nature and that of culture. These dimensions will be treated first by dividing each into two before moving on to other propositions.

First, the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of nature (N), non-interpretant (Ī) and sleep (Z) constitutes the functional principle of the natural world ‘N–Z’, which is based on non-interpretations of (representations of) objects. It is void of conscious freedom of choice and all semiosis functions on an ‘as-is’ principle, leading nature to wherever she may evolve. The outcome of semioses unstressed by consciousness or volition may be called thesisaorist. This is to emphasize the unstressed nature of semiosis in nature that is evident as the absence of interpretation as we understand it as well as to point to the fact that nature pre-dates all conscious being and is of undefined duration as such. By collocating this with the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of nature (N), object (O) and awake (A), where the phenomenal, living natural world ‘N–A’ resides and in which (bio-)semioses happen – within the object of nature without the possibility of interpreting itself as something else – the elementary semiotic mechanism can be said to be autophaneric.

This is to point to the ‘automatic’, inner functioning of nature in the sense that growth of plants and animals – evolution – happens by and in itself as the biological functions happening inside each organism show; each body of organic matter grows old and dies like celestial bodies.

In short, thesisaorist semiosis is an unstressed function, there is no guiding thought or consciousness, and it takes place in the dimension of nature. The (unguided) function of thesisaorist semiosis is autophaneric in that as a mechanism it represents objects of itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding conscious interpretation. From the 45° tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that the functional potential

---

11 Thesis + aorist; from ‘thesis’ (prosody): an unstressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in Greek or Latin verse; from ‘aorist’ (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb (especially in Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the action.

12 Auto + phaneros; from Greek ‘automatos’ (‘acting of itself’) from autos (‘self’); from Greek phaneros (‘visible, manifest’). Here it is useful to call to mind Peirce’s phaneron, “the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not” (CP 1.284). Here, the phaneron is moved from the mind to the sphere of material nature/evolution and the ‘visible’ or ‘bringing-to-view’ of phaneros should be understood as ‘manifest’ or ‘cause-to-appear’.

---
of ‘sign-ness’ in thesiaorist autophaneric semioseis is restricted according to the value of the modal category not-being-able-not-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of submission due to the lack of free interpretation. That is, natural beings take their natural habitat as natural, where there is no need (or possibility) for grand change.

Second, the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of culture (C), interpretant (I) and awake (A) constitutes the phenomenal cultural world ‘C–A’, the functional principle of which is based on interpretation alone and all semiosis functions on an ‘is-as’ principle, leading culture to wherever it may evolve. The outcome of semioseis stressed by consciousness or volition (by way of humans) may be called Arsisaorist\textsuperscript{13}. This to emphasize the stressed nature of semioseis in culture in the sense that everything in culture is artificial, objectivated matter carrying on interpretation but knowing no objects. Each object was, and has the potential to be, something else, hence there is no need to know them, only their interpretations. It also points to the pre-dating and indefinite duration of culture, albeit from a species-specific human point of view. Everybody is born into a culture. By collocating this with the triangle formed by including representamen (R) on the axis of culture (C), non-object (Ō) and sleep (Z), there lay the elementary semiotic mechanism of culture, ‘C–Z’. Cultural semioseis happen within culture without the knowledge of objects, distorting interpretations indefinitely, and can be said to be sciautomatic\textsuperscript{14}. As the reasons for absence of knowledge of objects indicate: culture is immaterial and inanimate matter, it may be said to function as deaf, dumb, and blind automatically without senses, facilitating only interpretation of meaning.

In short, arsisaorist semioseis is a stressed function, there is a guiding thought derived from consciousness (regardless that signs and/or interpretations of objects may take on a ‘life’ of their own, they have been instigated by someone) and it takes place in the dimension of culture. The (guided) function of arsisaorist semioseis is a sciautomatic mechanism in that it interprets representations of itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding objects; unaware of what it consists of. From the 45° tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued that the functional potential of ‘sign-ness’ in arsisaorist sciautomatic semioseis is restricted according to the value of the modal category being-able-not-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of independence due to the lack of objects, which in themselves are not essential to their being. That is, if culture adopts a new interpretation, it discards the object and the process of interpretation cannot be shut down by any means.

\textsuperscript{13} Arsis + aorist; from arsis (prosody): a stressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in Greek or Latin verse; from aorist (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb (especially in Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the action.

\textsuperscript{14} Scia + automatic; from Greek skia (‘shadow’); from Greek automatos (‘acting by itself’).
To put it in an ideational manner: thesisaorist autophaneric semiosis corresponds to randomness, light, rebirth and continuity, whereas arsisaorist sciautomatic semiosis corresponds to plannedness, darkness, death and discreteness. For the remaining two dimensions, it is useful to keep in mind the English word ‘thesis’ (‘a statement or theory put forward as a premise to be maintained or proved’).

Following the metatheoretical lines of consciousness as presented by Mamardashvili and Pyatigorskij (2011), I argue that all and each consciousness is situated in the sphere of consciousness, which possesses neither a spatial nor a temporal definition; it is ‘where’ each consciousness is situated pragmatically, yet not statically. It is the state(s) of consciousness in which there is a correspondence for each notional construct with the subject’s given psychic state as a structure or content of consciousness. States of consciousness are in themselves empty, though not as the opposition of form and content; a state of consciousness is not the antithesis of content in relation to it. That is, absence of thought does not entail absence of consciousness, which can exist without conscious thought.

That said, the semiotic activity and volition of human consciousness with regard to cognition, ‘A’ along with its constituent parts facilitate the sphere of conscious thought and acknowledged existence and may be said to be egeirothetic15. That is, consciousness is in an awake state that facilitates the structure ‘I’ and what follows, thus being capable of action at will. In the strict sense, all information from both culture (C) and nature (N) as well as from dream (Z) fall under this semiosic category as objects of knowledge. Instead of existing in the noumenal world of Ding an sich’s, we know of them and of everything else only through signs or through our memories of them, which, of course, are also signs, hence the absence of a specific function to this dimension. From the $45^\circ$ tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, it may be argued however that to an extent, the functional potential in egeirothetic semiosis as conscious thought and action by volition is restricted according to the value of the modal category being-able-to-do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of freedom due to the presence of ‘sign-ness’ in its totality. Everything there is to know can be known to the extent that signs can be known.

The also familiar lower-half ‘Z’ and its parts facilitate dreaming and unconscious thought in the sphere of consciousness and may be said to be oneirothetic16. Though dreaming occurs in the sphere of consciousness, the ‘I’ dreamt therein does not facilitate an identical ‘I’ to that of the mundane awake as a state, structure nor fact or content of consciousness. Granted, sometimes there is some degree of awareness or sense of self in a dream but in general it may be said that whilst dreaming, ‘I’ am not aware that I am dreaming. Indeed, only in reality do we suspect whether it is actual. ‘I’ is as is the

15  Egeiro + thetic; from Greek egeiro (‘to waken, to raise up’); from Greek thesis (‘placing, a proposition’).
16  Oneiro + thetic; from Greek oneiros (‘dream’); from Greek thesis (‘placing, a proposition’).
dream – unreal. A dreamer cannot decide the content of dreams nor am ‘I’ able to stop thoughts from appearing or the mind from wandering.  

As regards dreams, the gist of the matter is that the majority of representations or knowledge of them in this dimension become known to us only in retrospect. In general, reminiscing can take place only afterwards. It is categorically impossible to indulge oneself in the recollection of past events when they have not yet come to pass, or in the case of dreams, not yet ended. A dream is a memory in both senses of the word. As was pointed out, we ‘know dreams from our memory of them after we are awake,’ and also – excluding lucid dreaming – ‘I’ either does not exist as a mental construct or to say the least, it is wholly different by way of being in accordance with the *Traumwelt*, rather than the mundane reality. Were there reminiscing in a dream, it is part of the dream itself, in the ‘present’ of the *Traumwelt* that – in a sense – has nothing to do with reality. Dreams are not ‘real’ in the sense that they would exist so to say nor do they necessarily have an equivalent in reality; they are just dreams. And yet, as is known, dreams do serve a purpose in our existence, as for example strengthening and/or weakening memory and by this working through the whole ‘I’ and forming it in the process. From the 45° tilted point of view of *being-able-to-do*, it may be argued that to an extent, the functional potential of ‘sign-ness’ in oneirothetic semiosis is restricted according to the value of the modal category *not-being-able-to-do*, i.e. semiosis is in a position of powerlessness due to the lack of both object and interpretant, the representations of which are known to us only by memory.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, mandala-vandalization of the semiotic square by placing one on top of the other has yielded a fairly wholesome picture of the quadruple dimensional nature of semiosis according to the triadic relations of ‘sign-ness’ in each. The values of modal categories restricting semiosis, its main ‘states’ and ‘doings’ in two parallel dimensions (*N/C*), have been brought to view and are by extension applicable to the remaining two (*A/Z*) to support the central argument.

The first adaptation of the semiotic square in which the dimensions of semiosis were explicated, supports the existence and difference in characters of these dimensions more clearly by explicating their respective sign-relations and the nature of ‘sign-ness’.  

---

17 This faintly echoes Peirce’s Musement: “It begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of communion between self and self. If one’s observations and reflections are allowed to specialize themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half hours” (CP 6.459).
Secondly, what we perceive of the world – whether that of nature or of culture – we perceive only the manifest outcome via signs, not the latent reason or function. As was shown, thesisaoarist and arsissaorist semiosis are (non-)interpretations – the ‘doing’ if one pleases – that define and in part are the overall functional principles in their respective dimensions; nature is non-interpretative and culture is nothing but interpretation. Autophaneric and sciautomatic in their turn are the more-or-less material outcomes – ’state’ – that facilitate the primary functional principles in their respective dimensions as elementary semiotic mechanisms; nature as an object of submission in and to herself and culture as an independent non-object in and of itself. In their respective dimensions they correspond to the latent function and manifest form or, the unseen and seen of nature and culture. In short, thesisaoarist-autophaneric semiosis is object in submission to non-interpretation, whereas arsissaorist-sciautomatic semiosis is interpretation independent of objects.

Thirdly, egeirothetic semiosis – our daily semiotic reality consisting in part of nature and in part of culture encompassing both of the above dimensions in the body and mind (where to place ‘spirit’ is a different question) – was shown to function in full extent with regard to ‘sign-ness.’ The relations of signs and knowledge of separable dimensions of semiosis ironically captivates the intellect into its own distinct dimension. As such, it positions dream (and dreaming) – oneirothetic semiosis – as analogous and into a similar opposition as those of nature’s functional principle (N/Z) and culture’s elementary mechanism (C/Z) with regard to their counterparts due to the lack of both object and interpretation. Our cognition may be argued to be based partially on dreams of which we are not aware while dreaming and partially on dreams known from memory – a ‘doing’ and a ‘state’ as understood awake.

Or, expressed in terms introduced in this article – on the basis of our bodies being natural organisms and on the analogous structure and function of the human intellect and culture – a part of our consciousness and by extension cognition is based on known dreams that are an autophaneric-arsissaorist ‘state’ in egeirothetic reality, and a part on dreaming as such that is a thesisaoarist-sciautomatic ‘doing’ in oneirothetic reality and, as was proposed, they may be functionally concomitant. The former inevitably requires translation, because it is the result of the latter – an unknown language – and by this lifelong cycle of strengthening/weakening a mnemonic consciousness, parts of the world’s meanings are put to place.

Among other things, what separates human from beast is doubt – at some point the nature of reality and the realness of natural objects therein became dubious for our species and this dubiety was based upon the primordial, hesitant interpretation of the seemingly praeternatural in its surroundings that bursted into abstract existence, into thought by way of dreams. Confronted with something uncanny in its surroundings, the archaic, nigh-animal mind had every reason to suspect s/he was in a dream – or
that the dream was in reality – which led to a semiotic experiment in both dimensions. If it is what it seems to be as in nature and as in a dream – awareness of the latter enabling the possibility for it not to be what it seems to be; it could be or the very least it can be made to be something it is not – a cultural object. In short, the transit from nature to culture, from semiosic submission to independence required development and improvement of memory achieved by way of dream and semiosic powerlessness therein which aided transforming the immediate ‘stimulus-response’ reaction into a sign awake; into freedom.

This leads to suggest that what photosynthesis is to plants or what metabolism is to animals; what continuance and unpredictability are to culture – dreams and dreaming are their equivalent to *compos mentis* in human beings. The last trait is derived from consciousness, and considering its alleged changes during our phylogenesis along with the fact that we as natural beings are a product of evolution, it may be argued that consciousness as such should not be restricted within the boundaries of human flesh alone.

**References**


Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. (Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul; Burks, Arthur W., eds.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph numbers.]

Четыре возможности представления триадической «знаковости» в двух семиотических квадратах

В статье рассматривается семиозис и его измерения как теоретическая конструкция, чтобы показать некоторые элементарные различия между сферами семиотического действия. По сути знак будет разделен на четыре категории существования, чтобы показать, что он может иметь разные отношения в зависимости от того, в каком измерении он находится. Основной рамкой, вместе с тем, является человеческое сознание в его двух состояниях: в состоянии бодрствования и сна со сновидениями, с акцентом на последнее. Несмотря на широкое использование универсальных понятий ‘природа’ и ‘культура’, статья не сосредоточивается на семиотических особенностях этих доменов. С нашей точки зрения ‘природа’ и ‘культура’ имеют два уровня, т.е. проявленную форму и скрытую функцию, видимое и невидимое. Они используются параллельно, поддерживая центральный тезис этой статьи о том, что человеческое познание имеет соответствие в виде сновидения.

Теоретическая рамка взята из работы Греймаса и Курте с акцентом на семиотический квадрат. Понятие знака трактуется в духе Пирса, тогда как понятие «знаковости» дается по Пятогорскому. При проекции триадического знака на семиотический квадрат и исключении понятия «знаковой системы» вместе с синтаксическим аспектом, обнаруживается основное четырехкратное измерение знака, опирающаяся на определенные знаковые отношения в каждом данном измерении. Чтобы удвоить квадрат, семиозис будет наделен функцией «быть способным», таким образом обеспечивая начальное выражение доминирующих модальностей, служащих в каждом из четырех измерений основой для структуры (структур) элементарной функции и механизма. Это также даст возможность рассмотреть некоторые элементарные ограничения семиозиса в каждом из измерений. Наконец, предлагаются некоторые новые термины в соответствии с тем, что было представлено.

Triaadilise ‘märgilisuse’ neli võimalust kahel semiootilisel ruudul


Peamine teoreetiline raam tuleneb Greimase ja Courtés’ töödest, rõhuasetusega semiootilisele ruudule. Märgi mõiste võetakse Peirce’ilt ning “märgilisus” Piatigorski. Projitseerides triadilist
märki semiootilisele ruudule ning väljastades ‘märgisüsteemi’ mõiste koos sünkaktilise aspektiga, tuuakse nähtavate märgi neljakordne alusdimensioon, mis tugineb kindlatele märgisuhetele igas antud mõõtmes. Et ruutu kahekordistada, antakse semiosile ‘suutlikkuse’ jooned, lubades domineerivate modaalsuste algset väljendumist, mis igas neljast dimensioonist toimivad elementaarse funktsiooni struktuuri(de) ja mehhanismi alusena. See võimaldab vaatluse alla tuua ka mõned elementaarsed piirangud semiosile iga dimensioonis. Viimaks pakutakse välja mõned uued terminid.