Transdisciplinarity in objects: Spatial signification from graffiti to hegemony

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Abstract. Contemporary sociosemiotics is a way to transcend borderlines between trends inside semiotics, and also other disciplines. Whereas semiotics has been considered as an interdisciplinary field of research par excellence, sociosemiotics can point directions at transdisciplinary research. The present article will try to conjoin the structural and the processual views on culture and society, binding them together with the notion of signification. The signification of space will illustrate the dynamic between both cultures and metacultures, and cultural mainstreams and subcultures. This paper pays attention to the practice of sociocultural semiotisation of space and territorialisation by diverse examples and different sociocultural levels that imply semiotic cooperation between several members of groups that can be characterised as socii. We analyse territorialisation by graffiti, by furnishing spatial environment through artistic manners, by shaping the semiotic essence of cities through naming, renaming and translating street names, by pinning and structuring territories with monuments, by landmarking and mapping cultural space through individualisation of cities. We will see how principles of semiotisation of space are valid on different levels (individual and social, formal and informal, democratic and hegemonic, cultural and subcultural) and how these principles form a transdisciplinary object of study as ‘semiotisation of space’, and how space can be regarded as a genuinely transdisciplinary research object. Individual, culture, and society are connected in such an object both as constituents and as a background of study.

The current paper is a conscious experiment that aims at outlining sets of methods and objects in a transdisciplinary perspective.
Transdisciplinarity involves methods of diverse disciplines, but can be defined — and this is the main statement of this article — not so much through those methods, but through the objects of study. From the semiotic viewpoint, it is important that the range of objects is not limited to either artefacts or mentifacts, but involves also processes of signification. Thus the interplay of methods is added by Infinite Semiosis also on the metalevel, and from the social dimension of the semiotic activity we can again witness interaction between cultures and metacultures, interdependence of objects and methods of study. Our experiment, therefore, will entail seemingly very diverse objects ‘out there’, just as well as the binding of ‘structural objects’ with processes (of signification) as objects. Inasmuch as the structures and processes in sociocultural environments can probably best be approached from what is contemporarily associated with sociosemiotics, it is the latter from which we shall begin.

Sociosemiotics can perhaps be approached from two major angles. One way to understand its topics is associated with the study of particulars — either in the sense of relatively specific objects (media, commodities, etc.), or quite limited social strata involved in analysis (feminist studies, subculture research). Such possible comprehension of sociosemiotics could associate it with the study of social processes so as to be complementarily distinguished from cultural structures. Contrary to this narrow — and historically former — view, sociosemiotics can be considered as a very broad discipline, involving both basic theoretical scholarship and applied case studies. In the following, an attempt will be made to show that it is quite difficult and fruitless, if not impossible, to divide (socio)semiotic research objects according to obscure categories that sometimes accompany, for example, era-specific boundaries (for example, traditional — modern — postmodern objects, texts, social identities), or social boundaries that are becoming more and more vague as well (beginning from social roles to difficulties emerging with the notion and contemporary threefold division of gender). Further, when taking sociosemiotics as a discipline engaged in the study of nominally socially acute topics, we get entangled with problems mentioned, added
to by the fluctuation of the actualisation of several problems and pheno-
mena (for instance, globalisation, which cannot be, strictly speaking,
interpreted as a recent phenomenon entailed by, for example, tele-
vision or Internet). However, there exist also certain positive nuances in
defining sociosemiotics, according to very specific objects of study. For
example, the expression ‘social semiotics of media and mass commu-
nication’ (see, for example, Jensen 1995) implies a very wide actual area
of research. This, in turn, involves the whole topic of transdisciplinarity
and the fusion of metalanguages in contemporary social sciences and
humanities (see Conrad 2002; Papst 2004). In the context of semio-
tics, it becomes especially vividly apparent that transdisciplinarity can
be regarded as embedded in objects, being thus indefinable through
disciplinary boundaries (contrary to some cases of interdisciplinarity).
On the other hand, contemporary transdisciplinary developments
revive an old discussion concerning whether semiotics is a discipline
or a method. In the current paper, such a problem setting is considered
heuristically futile for the following reasons in short. There is no cor-
respondence between the object- and metalevel in the sense of the world
as if being segmented and divided between individual disciplines: in
the same manner as conditional fields, inside semiotics, imply com-
plex studies (for example, the semiotics of literature cannot escape the
study of cultural contexts, social relations), one can see that the analysis
of physical environment, in terms of its chemical contents or physical
characteristics, depends on the development of worldview. Research in
hard sciences is thus probably more successful when additional atten-
 tion is paid to its scholarly and sociocultural environment.

Further, it goes without saying that physical reality is not the exclu-
sive realm of hard sciences. Suffice it to remind us of the culture- and
language-specific cognition, or even more importantly, the perception
of the environment. By this we understand that the association of the
so-called hard sciences with the physical reality, and the suggestion that
the so-called soft sciences rather deal with ‘culture’, ‘mind’, ‘society’ and
the similar, is not only far-fetched, but also utterly premature. There are
at least three major aspects that lead us to such understanding.
The first of them — possibly also the primary from the viewpoint of modelling as well as from the standpoint of the individual, has been quite thoroughly discussed under the general title of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. We ought to remember that alongside with a wide discussion of linguistic relativity, their hypothesis also applies to cognition, even more interestingly to the perception of the environment. In this sense, physical reality is always filtered through the sociocultural reality, if not even depending on the latter.

The second reason to doubt rigid differentiation of hard and soft sciences, lies in an understanding that can — just possibly — be associated with sociological phenomenology: the reality in which people live, is socially (or socioculturally) constructed. As such, this construct is always context-sensitive and can only be studied through the involvement of informants. By today the understanding that objective sociocultural research cannot consist merely of the association between the scholar and his/her object on the table, seems to have reached the elementary pre-requirements of at least the studies associated with the social sciences. At the same time, studying signs and meanings via informants’ comprehension of those signs, has always been a ground and common truth in semiotics, having faded sometimes only due to forgetting the so-to-speak third whale of semiotics — pragmatics. Nevertheless, the fact that the mediation of reality is inevitable and necessary and the context-sensitivity of reality is unavoidable was realized by scholars of meaning already centuries ago and is in a nice accord with how the concept of mediation emerged in the sociocultural studies of reality after the articulation of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity.

The third (and probably even not the last) aspect that should convince us to take the so-called soft sciences with full seriousness but that so amusingly has often separated them from the hard sciences, has to do with a warning that was most explicitly conveyed by Bertrand Arthur William Russell in a published version already in 1940 (even before behaviourism enjoyed the first peaks of its popularity!). Russell warned us of undue trust in the devices for obtaining information on
research objects (Russell 1948: ch. 3, ch. 7): man has made the gadgets, willing to obtain ‘objective information’ about (physical) reality, doing so both according to his perceptive and cognitive capabilities, and his technologically accessible devices. In order to study, for example, what is going on in the infrared area, man must have made a presumption that there exists such a sphere of light. In order to use information captured by complex devices, man has created regulations and instructions for the interpretation of that data. At the same time, it is difficult to repeat chemical or physical measurements in fully identical circumstances. And if one would refer to physical or chemical tests carried out in laboratories where adequate repetition may seem possible, we could always refer to laboratories as socioculturally created artificial environments having nothing to do with the actual reality with all its nuances. Furthermore, the use of complex gadgets for measuring or testing the physical reality in contexts not reachable for man (for example, because of distance, due to perceptive limits, etc.), calls for immediate attention. Namely: how can we prefer, for example, an interpretation of a photograph obtained from a Mars rover as heralding of an iced river to an explanation of the image as caused by a scratch on the objective of the rover’s camera.

Taking the above arguments to a logical extreme, we might conclude by stating that the so-called hard sciences thus rather live and operate in the reality created by themselves, whereas disciplines studying man in his sociocultural and geographic environment, and being fully aware of the pragmatic principle(s), only deal with what they (sometimes) claim they deal with — the contextual sociocultural reality. Only such scholarship can strive towards and sometimes even happily claim objectivity, while the so-called hard sciences have reached such a level on encapsulation that they can hardly ever exit the bubble of subjectivity created by themselves.

Therefore, the context of sociosemiotics should demonstrate that the “dilemma” concerning the role of semiotics, either as a method or a discipline, is essentially remorseful and faulty: the same empty labels can be glued to any hard or soft science (for an extremely short and
undemanding, but pretty compendious bird’s eye view see Searle 1998: 1–65).

In the following, an attempt will be made to demonstrate how transdisciplinarity comes to light when selecting certain topics, objects or phenomena for analysis instead of departing from a specific area of study (see Klein 1996). At the same time, we shall try to stay in touch with some fields often regarded as pertaining to sociosemiotics. Thus, we shall try to aim at two targets often kept distinctly apart, when reminding of the aforementioned narrower views on sociosemiotics. We shall inspect the practise of the signification of space, trying to use the notion of signification process in order to thereby conjoin certain social groups and also social and cultural structures usually kept apart. We shall begin from a comparative analysis of discourses related to an axis ‘formal—informal, controlled—spontaneous’ insofar as this is bound with the topic of the signification of space, and insofar as these poles can be associated with the phenomenon of graffiti and the so-to-speak institutionally regulated spatial arrangements and signification. The signification of space can be viewed at several levels and from several angles; our aim will be the examination of certain tendencies in the so-called formal and informal discourses on and in space. The level of formality of institutions has sometimes been regarded as something that determines certain differences in (spatial) signification, whereas the current paper will try to bring forth some common features in them. It will hopefully become evident that the semiotic study of objects in contexts calls for a typological analysis of signification processes that cannot be separated by, for example, the level of formality. From the sociosemiotic viewpoint, both objects and methods of study form an intertwined web of transdisciplinarity (see Stewart 2001).

**Explicit territorialisation: Graffiti**

Before treating more general topics of spatial signification, let us briefly consider some aspects concerning the ‘informal’ side of territorialisation
in the way it has to do with graffiti. At the same time, prior to treating
graffiti, it must be stressed that the following overview has no other pur-
pose than to demonstrate how dependent space is on the signification
and the actual use of space. If we want to study a semiotic structure, as
space has often been viewed, the need for a transdisciplinary perspective
emerges already at the moment we adopt the view on space as a process
(of signification and usage). Inasmuch as graffiti so plainly brings about
the meeting of diverse, often contrary and contradictory discourses and
intentionalities that have to do with very dissimilar social and cultural
layers, graffiti serves just as a convenient example material handy for
everyone to experience. Thus, this chapter aims at casting light at some
transdisciplinary aspects of the signification of space, rather than at a
full disclosure of the phenomenon of graffiti as such.

The word ‘graffiti’ has become an international term used in seve-
reral languages for the phenomenon to be examined below. However, the
contemporary application of the notion has a confusing impact, when
remembering three main aspects of its origin. First, the word ‘graffiti’
is supposed to derive from *sgraffito* — a technique used in the Middle
Ages and Renaissance for decorating city houses: a house built was first
covered with ground paint which was in turn covered with fabric of
another colour; the upper layer of paint was scratched off, and a decora-
tive image on the basis of contrast with the other paint layer was formed.
Therefore — it was (primarily) a non-verbal mode of expression, while
nowadays the verbal part has significantly joined the wall painting, and
it has obtained no less importance than the pictorial mode. Apart from
often serving in a redundant manner, for instance, as a translation or
commentary on pictorial discourse, verbal expressions have acquired
weight as individual meaning-carriers.

A second aspect in the critique of today’s use of ‘graffiti’ has to do
with the contents of messages; hereby we are not referring to ‘actual
meanings’ or evaluative moments, but simply to a formal nuance:
*sgraffito* was officially or in other words, a socially and institutio-
ally accepted technique that belonged to the cultural mainstream.
As an urban decorative practice, it was, in semiotic terms, a positive
manifestation in relation to society and the ‘cultural’, while today the word ‘graffiti’ is connected primarily with negative and protest messages in relation to its contemporary cultural context. Thirdly, the phenomenon of graffiti has spread both socioculturally and spatially. A particular institutional or formal group of artists, and/or craftsmen, has been replaced or adjoined by more or less accidental or informal groups and individuals. Further, a particular type of space (house walls) has been neglected or added to by very diverse spaces in the city. Therefore, in etymological and semiotic aspects, the word ‘graffiti’ can today be rendered as confusing and misleading. However, candidates such as ‘scribble’, ‘decorative smut or littering’ and many others serve no better, for often the phenomenon is about elaborate artistic execution and no unorthodox words and messages; even the painters themselves sometimes refer to their field as “‘aerosol art’ or ‘writing’” (Miller 2002: 3). Thus, in the following ‘graffiti’ will still be used, keeping in mind the deficiencies it nowadays comprises.

Most generally, graffiti is always about territorial bordering (see, for example, Ley, Cybriwsky 1974). While *sgraffito* was a purely urban phenomenon, one can detect an increasing spread of graffiti to other types of settlement as well. However, a pretty clear distinction could be made between urban areas, in which graffiti has been extensive, and rural areas where it has not — for a reason other than concerning the previous case of *sgraffito*. Namely, it seems that graffiti is particularly widespread in the city as an environment favouring anonymity, while in the countryside social control among people is much stronger. Additionally, from the psychological viewpoint one might surmise that graffiti on a lonely barn’s wall does not provide the author with sufficient catharsis.

Graffiti’s function of territorialisation has to do with a simplest truth in spatial studies: people living in the city who have to cope with their everyday business, generally do not use places of the whole city space. Certain places have been formed, spaces in the city where they have to go and transact. This means that the ‘city’ does not have to mean all the territory depicted in, for example, city-maps or elsewhere, but that for every citizen, the city is an individualised object. In daily routine,
knowledge of the whole city is not needed — one has to know about just certain parts of it that are of some kind of importance for him/her. In K. Lynch’s terms, those parts can be important and functional in five main modes: necessary as (a) districts, (b) landmarks, (c) edges, (d) nodes, and (e) paths (see Lynch 1960). So, people do not operate with the city as a physical whole, but with a “city in the head”. The latter may be called the image of the city or the cognitive map of the city, where such an image does not correspond to the city as a physical realm, but instead we have to deal with constituents of the city, which have been picked up from the totality of the physical realm, and then combined together again. From the semiotic point of view, the latter procedures are of utmost importance: any selection, and the following modelling of the selected, is a significance producing activity (here ‘modelling’ is compared to the formation of the cognitive map). So, when talking about territorial demarcation in the city, in the face of graffiti, we have to deal exactly with the kind of phenomenon by the help of which city-space can be segmented, and through that, a selection for an individual image of the city be formed. Territorialisation through graffiti is about spatial signification, and the main features of its semiotic functioning have been understood more or less commonly in the surprisingly small amount of relevant literature (in English) in semiotic studies (for example, Cover 2002; Garí 1995; Silva 1990). The topic of territorialisation, in relation to subcultures, is one of the few that connects the relevant semiotic studies with more ethnographic overviews and collections of examples about graffiti (see, for example, Raabe 1982; Huber, Bailly 1986; Bushnell 1990), but the latter will not be considered in the present context.

Any signification is made possible through a sign-system, the units of which are known to the creator and/or its reader (interpreter). Thanks to the fact that the interpreter understands that (s)he faces units supplied with meaning (or: that s/he faces ‘signs’), (s)he can proceed towards assigning a more concrete meaning to them (or: towards signification). Likely, the signification of a territorial unit is always connected with recognition. This means that the identification of a geographical area, as a ‘district’ (or a ‘territory’), always presupposes
its recognition as distinguishable from others. It can actualise if such meaningful units are recognised, through the interpretation of which a given area is brought into a relationship with the mental map, and made meaningful therewith. As said, the process of signification can occur only if the individual shares certain rules of signification. Since these rules are conventional to a large extent, they have been composed and are valid in certain social units — for example in a society, in social groups, etc. Thus, an individual can recognise a signified area as a district/region/territory, if (s)he feels himself/herself as belonging to the relevant social group. Consequently, a territory is signified, if an individual perceives himself/herself as the author, or a member of a group of authors, of something belonging to him/her. This kind of authorship can be cognised either personally or as a result of a group activity, and it helps to assign such activity with a symbolic value (see also Silva 1990). Thus the given relation is twofold: a territory is signified by assigning it a symbolic value, and on the other hand — an individual can recognise and semanticise a territory, if (s)he grasps the symbolic essence of this territory. We can also describe this process through a so-to-speak value of signification: (1) semantic value of signification (or potential of meaningfulness), and (2) value of signification in practice (or pragmatic value of signification). The latter is exemplified by constant competition between those creating graffiti and its (‘official’) opponents — for instance, the use of more and more hardly washable paints and effective detergents (see Peteet 1996: 147–148). This way, graffiti messages inevitably become loaded with a so-to-speak societal semantic surplus.

The pragmatic aspect of graffiti’s meaning(fulness) has to do with the very conditions under which graffiti can emerge. Trivially, we can maintain that the nature of graffiti is always manifested by (1) the place of occurrence (for example, representation of male or female genitalia has not equal meaning in a public lavatory, in girls’ gymnasium, or in a class of an art school), and (2) the time of emergence (for example, the same representations before or after the ‘sexual revolution’). In short — graffiti is construed according to a specific place and the mode of
representation which, together with its temporary nature, stresses its stagedness or theatricality (see Silva 1990).

An important remark has to be made at this point: the category of graffiti is not fixed but fluid. Here, it becomes evident that graffiti is not a phenomenon outside others, it shares the feature of being context-dependent and subject to the mobility of genres as described by A. A. Berger (see Berger 1992: ch. 1) through other types of textual examples. What is cognised as graffiti in a society is relative, and depends on several principal relations, including for instance that which holds between the centre and periphery, classical and modern, decent and obscene in an epochal worldview (see Fig. 1).

It can probably be considered close to a paradox that what can technologically be reduced to sgraffito (though having actually been painted on tiles) is hardly categorised as ‘graffiti’ in the case of the well-known masterpiece of the Procession of Princes in Dresden. At the same time, the other example, at the train station of Dresden, just a few hundred

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*Figure 1. (a) ‘Graffiti’ is context-dependent. “Procession of Princes” and (b) social(ist) realism in Dresden, Germany.*
99

metres from the *Procession*, is often cognised as graffiti, though actually — probably — intended as a social-realist art piece for daily proletarian reflection (that the original has been contemporarily appended does not seem decisive hereby). Social(ist) realism is an interesting phenomenon that, through its principles and goals, had to take ‘art’ from galleries to the streets, and in the streets it started to switch from the status of art to a means of territorialisation. One of the most important and characteristic moments of that changeover is repetition: certain elements that had been taken from the communist and socialist ideological discourse to the sphere of art in the form of socialist realism, were separated again from the artistic discourse and presented in public space as ‘decorative elements’ (see Fig. 2a).

![Figure 2. Examples of (a) decorative socialist realism in motifs in public space; and (b) of the use of graffiti in advertising aimed at the youth (Rottkoerad or Rat Dogs in Tallinn, Estonia).](image)
One can probably make connections between the repetition of motifs and the graffiti of signatures as a means of territorialisation. Repetition is also what has made it possible to start using graffiti in the service of formal, though often non-governmental organisations. The latter exploitation of graffiti is mainly about (illegal) advertising of mostly contemporary goods and services (see Fig. 2b, campaign of ‘Ratdogs’ by a leading bank — Hansabank, now already Swedbank — in Estonia), and deserves attention exactly due to blurring boundaries between formal and informal, mainstream and sub-cultural (public) discourse (see also Grieb 1984). In such examples, the central cultural core, and spatially and/or the temporally peripheral are brought together by hazing or even alternating the originally pretty clear boundary between the culturally ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ by which graffiti has been functioning for most of the time of its existence. A. Silva has described the ‘traditional graffiti’ by its use of obscenity as a special power of representation (Silva 1990: 56). It seems, however, that such a definition of graffiti, according to which its semiotic nature is saying or showing the ‘prohibited’ at the right time and in the right place (or rather: wrong time and place), is insufficient. Some of the above examples have already demonstrated that the category of graffiti cannot be regarded as fixed, but additionally one can probably find a large amount of examples amongst the ‘bathroom smut’, in which there can be found nothing obscene. Probably, at most we could differentiate between the negative nature of graffiti, (including at least the as-if-mode of marginality, anonymity, spontaneity), and positive construction of this, which is directed to users (for example, advertisements).
Informal and formal spatial signification: Homological dialogue

While the function of graffiti, as a means of creating or demarcating territory is generally taken for granted, we also have to stress the mutually influential mechanism of graffiti and space. Here, we can outline two major types and functions of graffiti, and two relevant types of space. Firstly, we can make a principal differentiation between ‘communicative graffiti’ and ‘non-communicative graffiti’. This opposition hints at certain type of graffiti that has been created with communicative intention, and to another type that has not been laboured for communicating, but which can be conclusively called declarative. While the first type, to put it in terms of speech act theory, is also characteristic of the category of sincerity, the other cannot be subjected to the criterion of truth. As an example of communicative graffiti, we can examine, for example, “call number x”, “girls, come here on Sunday at 8.00”, even “John + Mary = ♥”, etc. The second type — the so-to-speak declarative graffiti — can be illustrated with “shit”, or other such enunciations.

In principle, these two types of graffiti can be distinguished on the basis of what has been proposed by M. Burgoon and others for separating ‘instrumental interaction’ from ‘communication with a consummatory function’: “Instrumental communication is a strategic activity […] in which communication can serve as an instrument to help us obtain desired outcomes” (Burgoon et al. 1994: 17). The consummatory purpose, however, can be defined “[…] as any communication activity that has the goal of satisfying the communicator without any necessary intent to affect anyone else” (ibid.). Thus, in fact, from the functional viewpoint, we can add to the latter type also pseudo-communicative graffiti like “fuck off” and the similar, especially when associating these types of enunciations with R. Jakobson’s ‘phatic communication’. Pseudograffiti has been defined, for example, mostly as the kind which does not say anything about the author (Reisner 1971: 166).
Such a view, however, seems limited in the sense that any communicative production has at least a potential to reveal information about the author (see Fig. 3).

Speaking about graffiti in Estonia (where its history basically began at the end of the Soviet’s strict rule), one can notice a clear tendency in the development of its semantic and pragmatic aspects where the expression of taboo-themes has been one of the most explicit types of graffiti (see, for example, Leete 1995; according to Leete, the general percentage of filthy words is at least 19%). Generally, the taboo-graffiti is also what indicates the openness of society, points out the level of freedom of speech. On the other hand, as the expression of taboos is usually punishable in one way or another, it is most understandable that this often becomes the most favoured topic of graffiti, because it is one of the most powerful and the easiest means of self-identification, territorialisation and simultaneous differentiation from the ‘normal’, ‘ordinary’ society (see, for example, Adams, Winter 1997). In Estonia, as in several other countries, graffiti came into being, opposing the tradition-core of the ‘cultural mainstream’. This determined the primitive nature of graffiti: it focused on taboo, in fact, even just on the expression of single

*Figure 3.* Even pseudocommunicative graffiti can inform readers at least of the literary capabilities of the author (example from Imatra, Finland).
taboo-words. Secondly, with the emergence of graffiti, it is not possible to make spatial differentiations, the divergence being rather concerned purely about the language. In public places, obscenities were expressed in a concrete language — either in Estonian or in Russian. This brings forth a most curious and weird (or maybe just most natural) case in the history of (Estonian) graffiti. Namely, groups based on nationality, creating graffiti, started to compete with each other for public spaces — graffiti created by another group was erased and replaced with the ‘own’. The fight went on not between counter-culture and mainstream culture, but rather between subcultural groups representing two cultural mainstreams on a social/national basis.

Later, according to a natural principle, this activity was substituted by the territorialisation of anonymous spaces. At that time, graffiti could be related only to a very limited range of expressions, and mostly to verbal ones such as ‘fuck’, ‘dick’, etc. (according to Leete, the proportion of filthy words reached 45.2% in public lavatories; see again Leete 1995). Of course, this univocally mirrored what remained outside the ‘official discourse’ (media, elementary and high school curricula) in that field. Besides this metainformative role of reporting on ideology, thanks to linguistic restrictedness, it basically gave quite clear a picture of the nationality of the author (or group of authors) instead of transmitting what it actually expressed. Originally, it was not possible to discern different conceptually oppositional groups to society, because: (a) the graphs were executed in public spaces and were therefore generally non-communicative, (b) they lacked the function of territorialisation in physical space, and (c) they were mostly directed against other ‘clans of graphs’ (bearing possibly the function of de-territorialisation).

There is a controversy in relating graffiti to public or anonymous space. Namely, ‘public space’ must not necessarily be, and very often is not, anonymous, but loaded with meanings related to cultural history and tradition. Public space is signified, segmented, categorised through (for example, architectural) functions, names, etc. Therefore, a respective pair of types of space for the two types of graffiti could be: ‘public space’ and ‘anonymous or semiotically open space’. Apparently,
as a canvas, ‘public space’ is more valuable for the so-to-speak classical graffiti (not for sgraffito), which connects with the topic of taboos and obscenities. In anonymous spaces, usually belonging to the periphery for its degree of public use (periodically, seldom used places), attention can be received only from those intending to give it, and thus contrary to taboo-exclamations, self-expressive graffiti can be met more often (see Fig. 4., the text visible, being apparently a reply to the smeared message above it, says that: “What do you want to accomplish with that? I reply: you accomplish nothing with that! Jaanika”).

Communicative graffiti is thus favoured in ‘no-man’s-land’, which is often quite distinct from public spaces (concerning both physical and semiotic spaces): society uses the latter (streets, public bathrooms) daily in passing and not paying specific attention to them. Open or anonymous space is something not used frequently by the larger population (stadiums, places for mass events, deserted places), or remains without attention (same, but also for example long ‘paths’ that are in use, but passable only by vehicles, or used in connection with specific
functions, for example, stations, certain districts). At the same time there can occur blended cases in which graffiti enters into interaction with spaces that can be associated with the ‘official discourse’. In every settlement, there obviously exists either an informal or formal boundary between ‘anonymous space’ and ‘public space’, in the sense that there exists a certain line or limit from where the establishment of the core culture begins. These boundaries can be implicit (for example, contemporary suburbs and ghettos), or explicit. The latter concern, for instance, porches of settlements such as airports, harbours, railway or bus stations. Such entrance areas are clearly spots of ‘translation’ where introduction with the culture core of the ‘own’ is inevitable, even due to the historical roots of the city-culture. Today, even more than during the era of the emergence of cities, we can observe tendencies in the so-to-speak communal will to be differentiated from the ‘others’ by specific characteristics. In Estonia, such distinctive features have been forged into city-slogans (such as Pärnu — Summer Capital, Otepää — Winter Capital, Paide — Heart of Estonia, Tartu — City of Good Thoughts). Apparently, the situation in which formal core culture has opened such an explicit self-identification discourse, feeds counter-culture with exceptionally advantageous information on how to build up its own. Thus, sometimes such boundaries between the public and the anonymous, the formal and the informal are created that bring forth an actual need for interaction between the mainstream and the subcultural. However, when left unattended, there can emerge fused discourses that share the potential power of formal institutions and convey messages of (probably) another ideology (see Fig. 5).

It can be maintained that any type of graffiti shares the feature of being connected with a specific type of space, and that any type of graffiti is principally a means of territorialisation, either in intentional or unintentional, in direct or indirect manner. When talking about loading public space with meaning or the signification of space so that it has to do with the technique of graffiti, we apparently have to widen our scope of view to another angle. Namely, whereas graffiti often has to do with relatively short messages or enunciations, related to a certain space
(and thereby also to a certain sociocultural context), there are other means, of principally the same function, to be mentioned.

Slogans can probably be brought forward as a category of messages closely linked to graffiti, with some of their common features being in short-term nature and brief in textual length (see, for example, McGlynn 1972). Even though the origin of the slogan, as a Scottish war or gathering cry, can be considered not confined spatially, typologically it still remains bound with the specific type of space (battlefield). The same goes for contemporary slogans used in parades, slogans as decorations

*Figure 5. A portal of Tartu, the railway station together with background information from the formal discourse. The logo of (a) Estonia (bound with the logotype “Positively transforming”); (b) the city (both non-existent in the actual place, but intensely advertised in media); and (c) an introductory guide in Estonian from the station: “Kill women” (Tartu, Estonia).*
in the spatial context of parades, so-to-speak special exclamations in specific spaces (for example, “Glory to work!” in Soviet factories). There is a particularly interesting notification to make when trying to analyse for example graffiti, slogans and other types of condensed messages-signifiers under the general topic of spatial signification. As mentioned, spatial signification always indexes items of importance in sociocultural chronotopes, it reveals relations between cultural mainstreams and subcultures. Graffiti can be looked at as a negative film of those relations, and it is important that graffiti subcultures cannot be dealt with as independent phenomena separated from core culture; it is the latter that feeds graffiti with topics and vocabulary cast out from the centre, or treated as taboo. At the same time, graffiti subcultures are on a constant counter-offensive, trying to flood the core culture with peripheral themes and lexicon, spread in the (physically or semiotically) central parts of the public space of settlements. Graffiti thus is, in principle, a subculture with a pretension for (at least semiotic) totalitarianism (especially in its form of spreading signatures; see Peteet 1996: 148–150), trying to cast the core culture, which it feeds upon, to peripheral zones. Thus, graffiti cannot be regarded — although it often has been (see, for example, MacDonald 2001) — as a subculture that has as if created a separate world for itself apart from the ‘legal one’. As a matter of fact, graffiti exemplifies a subculture working according to the same principles it protests against, and even though graffiti exists being about ‘remapping the city’ (Miller 2002: 4), it nevertheless follows certain features of spatial modelling that can be traced in other discourses as well.

Hegemonic territorialisation: Physical, cultural, and social dimensions

When talking about territorialisation and the signification of settlement space, we can observe some of the principles, viewed above, also working in more ‘traditional’ or formal discourses. At this point, I would like to remind readers of the practice of signification carried out in most
settlements across the former Soviet Union. There we could detect a similar tendency in the signification of public spaces as in the case of graffiti, while the latter virtually did not exist (at least not as much as in the West). Namely, one can probably claim that settlement spaces (and places within those spaces) were conditionally graded according to their ‘importance’, and in the concentric manner, explicitly ideologically signified. Thus, in practically all of the former Soviet Union, in the central parts of cities, place names reflected the ‘official ideology’ (for example, Victory Square, Lenin’s Prospect or Boulevard). While we are accustomed to talking about ideological signification of places involving, for example, the renaming of cities (such as the cases of Stalingrad, Leningrad), the same could be met in the city-space itself, and not only in the face of renaming central streets for items of Soviet ideology (for instance in Tartu: Knight’s Street to the Street of the 21st of June), but also in the practice of ‘translation’ of place names and street labels from the Latin alphabet into the Slavic one. The openly ideological purpose of such translation that in its essence, coincides with the type of signature-graffiti, could be met in all cities across the former Soviet Union that did have bilingual labels of space (see Fig. 6).

Figure 6. Ideal translation or hegemonic signature? Bilingual (Estonian and Russian) street sign (Tartu, Soviet Estonia).
Thus, the topic of spatial signification has to do with the theme of signification in general, just as well as with naming. Naming, in turn, leads to the issue of understanding what the world consists of after all. In that sense, name and naming are not merely about the matter of how signification connects with language and the functioning of language in the semiological gist, for the topic of naming binds names with space and, through space and changes in space, also with the category of time. Therefore, naming is the very spot between the physical and the conceptual where semiotisation, or modelling, takes place with a high probability of being executed with communicative purposes. If names are elementary units of language, it could be stated that the creation of language and world are dynamically and elementarily bound. Or in other words: naming is connected with the creation of the/a semiosphere in that wider perspective in which the germs of semiosphere lay in the notion of biosphere (reminding, at this point, of B. Whorf’s treatment of links between language and perception). In this sense, the creation of language and the semiotisation of space go hand in hand, and we could speak about ‘cultural space’ and units contained in it as essentially ideological in the sense that the use of language and the naming or the semiotic usage of what exists in space ought to be conceptually congenial. In other words, when talking about purely conceptual structures, we would still be discussing the topic of concrete and abstract reference in the way ‘naming’ binds these two spheres, and in the manner the origin of abstract referents is present in the concrete ones.

On the other hand, our discourse would touch upon the semiotisation of environment, via culture-genetic names, also in the trivial sense ‘naming’ concerns the transfer of abstract reference back to concrete referents. This is to say that, through naming, we can draw conclusions back to the structures of cultural areas as spaces of more or less homogeneous cultural traits and the conceptual background of the latter. In this aspect, we can talk about such characteristic phenomena as naming and renaming of spatial units, and examples such as the 70 plus cities of Alexandria left behind by Alexander the Great in the conquered areas. Territorial homogenisation, through naming, can be met in the instance
of the transfer of city names of the Old World to the New, but trials of blunt standardisation are more obvious when we recall the area of the former Soviet Union where there simultaneously existed 50 cities named Kirov, 70 settlements with the name of Oktyabrsk…

As mentioned above, attempts at creating uniform conceptual space can be seen in the policy of naming streets. In the case of the former Soviet Union, there could be noticed an interesting trend regarding streets named after important party figures or historical events, central to the past of the Communist Party. That tendency is what probably could be associated with allusion, however not in the traditional meaning of more or less explicit references to sociocultural tradition and the ‘familiar’. On the contrary, there can be noticed a technique of purposeful de-familiarisation — though again — not in the normal Shklovskian meaning (the latter has to do with making things unfamiliar in order to prolong the process of perception). We know that the communist ideology, appealing on ‘the bright future in communism’, in a way distanced itself from mundane worries and problems, treating them as ‘obstacles’ in the way, generated mostly by capitalists and imperialists. The true essence of important matters laid, so-to-speak, behind (or ahead of) such problems. Thus the communist ideology, speeches of party leaders and explanatory discourse, remained at least a bit distant or ‘beyond the grasp’ of ordinary working people. In this sense, communism, as a regime built on the foundation of Russian orthodoxy, followed the principles of a religion itself. Fusing physical reality and space with the utopian discourse was thus of practical value for the Party, and one is not surprised any more to meet examples of such a policy, when walking in streets with names like Avtogennyj, Gazovski, Inkubatornyj, Vagonoremontnyj, Fourth of March 8, Mosneftekip and the like, with meanings often beyond the comprehension of an ordinary man.

These are, therefore, common examples that, when developed further, can be found also in other instances of spatial signification based on naming. We can meet the sovietisation of space through monuments that enable the unification of physical space, time and history. In this practice, quite the same principles are valid: on the one hand, there
exist so-to-speak universal names, the meaning of which is activated according to a specific context in a particular manner (see Fig. 7a). Such names-monuments were standardised products of pipeline processing bearing messages in Russian, and in a local language. On the other hand, there existed signifiers of the nature of the proper name that were individual and also semantically bound to a specific environment (see Fig. 7b).

A third kind of examples can be found in cases of spatial signification that used the principles of motifs, (see Fig. 8) where a slogan was used in several places in the structurally diverse architecture of monuments. Fourth, we can meet transfers of abstract reference to physical space where the abstract reference does not share features with concrete events or actual phenomena. Here we can talk about pure naming or spatial signification (see Fig. 9).

Examples of the erection of monuments in places in which there had taken place no activity referred to in the textual notifications on the monument, are not rare and can sometimes be explained by
Figure 8. Motifs in spatial signification in monuments: “People, beware!” (Valga and Võru, Estonia).
the need for filling ideologically ‘empty spaces’. Our example is from Mändjala, Saaremaa (Estonia) where people are reported as having been shot by “German (war) criminals”: “In these surroundings, during 1941–1944, 60 Soviet patriots were murdered by German occupants and their accomplices”. Local people have no memory of the event. The particular case (Fig. 9) is of interest as a particle in the creation of ideologically loaded space, for it occurs on the way to a grand memorial (in Tehumardi battlefield, Saaremaa), while the path — ‘path’ also in the above-mentioned analytic sense — to the latter would otherwise be ‘empty’.

Thus, it can be noticed that proper names and descriptions may often exchange positions, and in actual situations there occur cases of signification in which it is not possible to distinguish between Sinn and Bedeutung in G. Frege’s sense. At the same time, it is probably natural
that there exist culture-genetic meanings that possess no physical extension or a base of concrete reference. On the other hand, the technique, by which description is condensed into a signifier of the nature of proper name, makes it easier to semioticise both space and cultural space in more general terms (even though the case might be that of the ‘unknown soldier’ or a fictitious ‘private Ivanov’). So, the topic of ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’ is, in other words, again the one of abstract and concrete reference and connected with, at least to a certain extent, the arbitrary nature of signification, when talking about the level of institutions (not of individuals).

The above examples have mostly to do with the compression of (deeply ideological) descriptions into signifiers of the type of proper name, helping to organise a cultural space. Often, spatial signifiers bring along historical events that have been embodied or expressed through individuals (the city of Kirov, Lenin’s Prospect), and the same can be said about spatial mythological constructs (in Estonia, for example, places associated with Kalevipoeg or streets named after Vanemuine on the basis of the national epic). At the same time, even in the case of subjects of proper names of the nominally common type, we can observe such basement stones that lay in concrete referents. For example, in archives dating back to the former Soviet Union, we can find such personal names as Scholastica, or more context-specific ones as Enthusiast, Collectivist, Shaft, Pyatiletka. Therefore, there arises a justified question: if we can characterise certain architecture as fit or unfit for graffiti, certain behaviour as ‘Parisian’, how is ‘shaftness’ reflected or represented in someone? If it is possible to condense descriptions into proper names, why cannot features be associated with them?

From the Estonian context a specifically interesting aspect adds to this question. Recently, in 2005, a governmental regulation was approved according to which ‘inappropriate’ names cannot be given to newborn children. So it has been legislatively established that it is possible to measure what names are appropriate or inapt for Estonian children, and to actually determine the degree of ‘Estonian-ness’ necessary for surpassing the threshold of proper naming, and the very
content of the notion of ‘proper name’ was cast into a novel light. These problems connect to the question about what dimension of the semi-otic reality has been chosen for intertextualisation through naming. There exist traditions of naming in which the social base is prevailing (such as naming in reigns of Russian emperors after the Viking period, naming and derivation of names in Christian cultures), whereas our above examples seem to represent other tendencies. When names for social units — that is — personal names of nationalities mix up with, for example, those of historical events (such as Pyatiletka), there emerges a reverse signification: human beings become sign-vehicles, signifiers for historical, spatial or other kinds of entities. Naturally, often there can be observed a connection between spatial and social entities, developed during the course of time in an especially natural manner, holding for family names that can relate to a life-style in a concrete cultural area (for instance, family names in agricultural areas, or surnames related to the forest and forestry industry).

It seems then that the study of ‘naming’, as the use of suggested ready-made products, or at least as the relating of certain existing signifiers to existent referents, is not productive. Instead, we should try to return to the abovementioned situation in which language (in the wider sense of mental mapping) and environmental perception are no less than simultaneous (not only phylogenetically, but through socialisation also ontogenetically). In this way we reach a central topic in the creation of the semiotic reality and units in it, that is — ‘facts’. C. S. Peirce has proposed a “division of the elements of phenomena into the categories of quality, fact, and law” (CP 1.427). Even though today the three are often separated, it seems that from the Peirce’s perspective, when taking into account the twelve features of fact (CP 1.435–1.440; see also CP 1.427–1.434) these categories are relative and depend on the specific nature of society and culture. They are not principally different, for they are bound with sign systems and must be semiotically shared in order to let communication function.

When talking about the distinctive features of things or phenomena, such as, for example, favourite examples of ‘resistance’ or ‘redness’, then
the loss of distinctive features behind one’s back (‘there is no sound of wind in the willows unless we hear it’) could not be true already because, without the relevant presupposition or belief, we would not even recognise that phenomenon (we cannot determine a feature unless we assume that determination is possible). We can agree with M. Merleau-Ponty’s summarised critique of empiricism that “[…] cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 28). Thus, it is important to keep in mind that when talking about the existence of an ‘A’ in the world, then, for the semiotisation of that ‘A’, there may even not be present a ‘semiotic system’ in which that ‘A’ could be compared with other meaningful units of the same level. Indeed, that ‘A’ already does exist in a certain background system, for even a background, not having been elaborately defined, can serve as a possibility for the creation of a meaningful unit: the one who executes semiotisation can be that very background him/herself (see Fig. 10). This may seem a minute detail, but yet it is a preliminary for the creation of semiotic systems, and it seems to have been proved also by our example of the landlord’s map of the Vao manor house (Estonia) dating from the 18th century. Semiotisation can only be executed from a certain platform, and that platform involves a subject who is making phenomena meaningful.

Figure 10. Mapping the semiotic reality always entails a semiotising agent as (included into) a background system (Vao, Estonia).
Such a seemingly simplistic point was apparently, though implicitly, kept in mind also by Peirce, when he maintained that:

It is not enough to say that A parts with C, and that B receives C. A synthesis of these two facts must be made to bring them into a single fact; we must express that C, in being parted with by A, is received by B. If, on the other hand, we take a quadruple fact, it is easy to express as a compound of two triple facts. ... We are here able to express the synthesis of the two facts into one, because a triple character involves the conception of synthesis. (CP 1.371)

Yet such a synthesis is presupposed in a reflection of any single semiotic unit, for that very unit cannot but only be a part in a mental map or an element in a semiotic system in other words.

It was probably also this aspect that Peirce kept in mind when implying meaning, or at least the potentiality of meaningfulness, already on the monadic level (see CP 1.424). Even when speaking about ‘red’, ‘toothache’, or ‘bitter taste’, the case is not about immanently individual universes of meaning, but about qualities with ‘shared features’. The same understanding was reached in the cultural anthropology of the 20th century (Kluckhohn 1961), and stressed also in linguistics from the aspect of both cultural and linguistic relativity in expressing not only segments of the environment in general, but also in the communication of time and quantity as abstractions (Whorf 1941). From the semiotic context, we could recall Peirce’s treatment of facts, referred to above and reach the same result of mutual conditioning between language and space.

In this framework, such dynamic and mutual dependence is now again explainable through the pair of the ‘ontological’ and the ‘epistemic’, while their relations have largely been established by socio-cultural institutions. Again we stand at the spot where it is defined through naming what exists ‘really’ and what is ‘in the mind’, however — in relation to both characteristics, descriptions, and names. Attempting to systematise this complexity, we could distinguish between four types of features (ontologically objective, ontologically subjective, epistemically objective and epistemically subjective) as done by J. Searle (1995). This is how we can also explicate the ways descriptive features and traits of facts — or qualities, facts, and laws in Peirce’s terms — are related.
The ideologisation of segments of the environment is revealed in naming that often follows the line by which epistemically subjective features are developed towards the presentation of them as ontologically objective (beginning from relatively ‘innocent’ cases as the Estonian habit to have ‘capitals’ for winter, education, culture, summer, etc., to openly and overtly hegemonic totalitarianism in, for example, Turkmenistan where Saparmurad Niyazov acts as the Turkmenbashi). In the former Soviet Union, such objectivisation of ideological structures was often forged into legislative acts (such as regulations of ordering the naming of places, institutions after a recently deceased party leader). Apparently, this kind of object treatment can be observed also in the contemporary world, and in our context it significantly follows the above-described techniques of territorialisation, dynamism between culture core and periphery, and the coexistence of diverse genres in spatial signification.

Roundup

Thus, we can see that in the situation of communication into which, according to T. Parsons (1952: 4), there belong physical, social, and cultural objects, the transfer of features is not only directed from cultural objects to structures of identity. Through naming, also the semiotisation of physical objects is performed by the help of cultural and social types of objects, and sociocultural features of objects. This may seem trivial, but in practical situations it is about the classical displacement technique that, in the end, makes it possible to talk about the ‘Axis of Evil’, ‘Empire of the Evil’, ‘Imperialist World’, ‘Third World’, ‘developing countries’ or the similar, and to then apply concrete policy, or military force as a continuation of policy, to the relevant structures. In order to understand the formation of such macrostructures, continually worked out and presented in world policy as explanations of the global organisation of the contemporary world, it is necessary to bring it to awareness that the their formation is nothing exceptional or detached.
From the sociosemiotic viewpoint, when spatial signification has been examined, it becomes evident that the topic cannot be limited to the study of only physical surroundings (such as architecture or urban planning). Spatial signification brings together several dimensions of a sociocultural and physical environment, and serves as an object of transdisciplinary research *par excellence*, showing that a semiotic study of semiotisation ought rather to define techniques and principles of semiosis as objects of research. By this we can also inspect functional relations between the relevant social and individual levels, cultural and social structures and processes.

Hopefully what was written above demonstrated that when we are talking about spatial signification, we are, in fact, talking about also purely conceptual spheres. Thus spatial signification has to do with certain elementary features of signification in general, and from that very elementarity, there derives that these features inevitably imply a certain degree of universality, which brings together several areas and types of discourses (formal and informal, mainstream and subcultural, verbal and pictorial, etc., etc.) often kept apart. It seems that transdisciplinarity has, therefore, been inscribed into the very germs of semiotics as a discipline. Also, our overview of diverse types of spatial objects and objects in space must have proved again that semiotics really is about the study of signs as relations, relations between sign-relations, rather than about the study of hypothetically sovereign signs.

By a demonstrative trial to take space as an object for a semiotic study, we could see that space embraces numerous dimensions, contains all walks of human activity, and therefore inevitably calls for involving perspectives of diverse disciplines. All the more — we could see that instead of space, we ought to study the semiotisation of space, that is, we should turn our attention to the creation of semiotic relations. Our concrete analysis involved some examples of the signification of space in the face of graffiti, as well as the shaping of cultural space through systems of monuments. These were just instances demonstrating that space, spatialisation of meaningful structures, naming spatial structures and naming items in the semiotic reality, as well as in the physical
environment are mutually linked, and are directly connected with the issue of semiotisation and building semiotic relationships in general. In a way, space in the above was just an example, being conveniently so general that it enabled to show that not only semiotic objects, but also semiotic processes should, if at least somehow possible, be analysed simultaneously. This, again, is an immanently semiotic, as also a genuinely transdisciplinary issue. Yet the sociosemiotic focus stressed above, was to remind us of this pretty simple truth, sometimes forgotten alongside with the pragmatic dimension of semiotics.¹

References


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Трансдисциплинарность объектов: пространственное
означивание от граффити до гегемонии

Современная социосемиотика предлагает возможности преодолеть
границы между разными направлениями как внутри семиотики, так и
между семиотикой и другими дисциплинами. Если семиотику считают
отличным примером интердисциплинарной науки, то социосемиотика
может указывать на новые направления трандисциплинарных иссле-
дований. В данной статье делается попытка соединить процессуальные
и структуральные взгляда на культуру и общество, соединяя их с
концепцией означивания. Обозначение и означивание пространства
иллюстрирует динамику между культурами и метакультурами,
культурными господствующими тенденциями и субкультурами.
Статья обращает внимание на социокультурную практику семиоти-
зации пространства и территориализацию, используя разнообразные
примеры и различные социокультурные уровни, которые
подразумевают семиотическое сотрудничество между несколькими
членами групп, которые могут быть охарактеризованы как социумы.
Мы анализируем территориализацию, осуществляемую посредством
граффити, посредством оформления пространства художествен-
ными средствами, формирования семиотической сущности городов
посредством обозначения, переименования и перевода названий улиц,
посредством маркирования/«пунктирования» и структурирования
территории памятниками, посредством географического и культурного
«мэппинга» индивидуализируя города. Мы убеждаемся, что принципы
семиотизации пространства действительны на разных уровнях
(индивидуальный и социальный, формальный и информальный,
демократический и гегемонистический, культурный и субкуль-
турный), и что эти принципы формируют трансдисциплинарный
объект, который можно назвать ‘семиотизацией пространства’.
Таким образом, и само пространство можно считать по-настоящему
трансдисциплинарным объектом исследования. Человек, культура, и
общество объединены в таком объекте и как составные элементы, и
как фон исследования.